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ABSTRACT
pi-Cipher is one of the twenty-nine candidates in the sec-
ond round of the CAESAR competition for authenticated
ciphers. pi-Cipher uses a parallel sponge construction, based
upon an ARX permutation. This work shows several state
recovery attacks, on up to three rounds. These attacks use
known values in the function’s bitrate, combined with values
found through exhaustive search, to retrieve the remaining
values in the internal state. These attacks can break one
round, for any variant of pi-Cipher, in negligible time. They
can also break two or three rounds much faster than exhaus-
tive search on the key, for some variants. However, these
attacks only work against version 1 of pi-Cipher, due to the
differences in the padding function for version 2.0. To fill
this gap, this work also includes a one round attack against
version 2.0, building upon the distinguisher present in the
pi-Cipher submission document.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→ Cryptanalysis and other at-
tacks;
Keywords
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divide and conquer attack
1. INTRODUCTION
The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security,
Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) is currently in its
second round.[1] CAESAR is a cryptographic competition
called by Daniel J. Bernstein, which aims to find a number
of authenticated ciphers suitable for widespread use. There
have been fifty-seven submissions to the CAESAR compe-
tition. Of these, twenty-nine have been chosen to enter the
second round. One of these is pi-Cipher.[4] The current ver-
sion of pi-Cipher is version 2.0,[3] but much of this work is
based upon analysis of the previous version 1.[2]
pi-Cipher is built upon a sponge construction using an
ARX permutation. It uses a new mode of encryption, which
allows plaintext or associated data blocks to be processed in
parallel using a counter and a common internal state derived
from the key and the nonce. This work shows several state
recovery attacks on pi-cipher. Each of these attacks uses the
basic structure of the pi permutation to recover unknown
values in internal state. The details of these attacks are
listed in Table 1.
The first three attacks assume that an attacker has access
to the bitrate of the sponge construction, both before and af-
ter a single pi permutation. With pi-Cipher version 1, this is
trivial to achieve by encrypting a single message block, with-
out any associated data, and without using a secret message
number. The first bitrate can be taken from the encrypted
block. The second bitrate can be found in the authenti-
cation tag. Since there is a single message block, with no
authenticated data or secret message number, this tag has
not been added to any other tags.
However, this method does not work in pi-Cipher version
2.0. Due to a change in the padding function, there is always
at least one block of associated data being processed. If a
message has no attached associated data, it is padded out
to one block. It is no longer possible to retrieve the message
tag by itself, since it is always combined with at least one
associated data tag. This means that the first three attacks
cannot be used against pi-Cipher version 2.0. They can still
be used against version 1, and they may also be effective if
the pi permutation is used with other modes of operation,
such as duplex authenticated encryption, which provide an
attacker with access to the information they need.
There is a fourth attack shown which does not require
access to two consecutive bitrates. This attack is based upon
the single round distinguisher which is included in the pi-
Cipher submission document. This attack is less efficient
than the other attacks, but unlike the others, it is applicable
to pi-Cipher version 2.0.
2. THE STRUCTURE OFpi-CIPHER
The structure of a single pi permutation round is shown
in Figure 1. In the figure, the I1 through I4 boxes represent
the internal state prior to the permutation. The K1 through
K4 boxes represent the state after the permutation. The J1
through J4 boxes are intermediate states, part way through
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Table 1: Attacks on pi-Cipher
Number of Rounds pi-Cipher variants
Time Complexity
(In pi computations)
Space Complexity
(By word size)
1
pi16-Cipher096v1
pi16-Cipher128v1
pi32-Cipher128v1
pi32-Cipher256v1
pi64-Cipher128v1
pi64-Cipher256v1
1 25
2
pi16-Cipher096v1
pi16-Cipher128v1
pi32-Cipher256v1
266 or 2130 26
3
pi16-Cipher096v1
pi16-Cipher128v1
pi32-Cipher256v1
264 or 2128 25
1 pi16-Cipher096v2 268 268
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Figure 1: A Single pi-Cipher Round
the round. Finally, the C1 and C2 boxes are constants used
to process the permutation. Note that this figure is different
from the one shown in the pi-Cipher submission document.
Here, the bottom row has been renamed, to avoid ambiguity
in the original diagram.
To avoid ambiguity over multiple rounds, the J and K
boxes have two numbers. The first will represent the round,
and the second the box’s position. For example, J1,3 is the
J box in the first round which is third from the left
Each of the boxes represents four W -bit words, where W
is set individually by each variant. Each of the standard
pi-Cipher variants has a state that is four boxes, or sixteen
W -bit words, wide. Version 2.0 of the pi-Cipher submission
document also includes several wide-block variants, with a
much larger number of boxes. However, most of the attacks
discusses here do not apply to those variants. As such, all
diagrams in this work will show an internal state that is
only four boxes wide. The odd-numbered boxes—I1, I3,
Kr,1, and Kr,3—make up the bitrate of the sponge construc-
tion, where r is the number of rounds in the permutation.
These have been coloured green. All interaction with the
sponge construction takes place through the bitrate. The
even-numbered boxes—I2, I4, Kr,2, and Kr,4—are the ca-
pacity of the sponge construction.
The permutation functions by repeated use of the ARX *
operation. This operation takes two inputs, each with 4·W
bits, and produces a single output, also 4·W bits long. The
exact specification of the * operation is unimportant for the
attacks detailed here. However, it is important to know that
the * operation can be run backwards. Given the two inputs,
one can calculate the output. But given one input and the
output, one can also calculate the other input. Given any
two of the three values, somebody can find the third.
The attacks in this work aim to recover the unknown ca-
pacity values given only the known bitrate values. These
attacks make extensive use of the * operation, which can
recover an unknown value from a pair of known values. An
attacker can use this to recover the unknown values in the
internal state. Once an attacker has recovered the entire
internal state, they can run the permutation forwards or
backwards. This might be used to recover the key, or to
forge an authentication tag on a new message. More details
are given in Section 7.
3. STATERECOVERYONONE-ROUNDpi-
CIPHER
We assume the attacker starts with knowledge of the bi-
trate both before and after the pi permutation. This gives
them access to the I1, I3, K1,1, and K1,3 boxes. They also
have knowledge of the constants C1 and C2. Immediately,
the attacker can use their knowledge of the I1 and C1 boxes
to find J1,1. The attacker can then use the newly-recovered
J1,1 box, along with the known K1,1 box, to run the * oper-
ation backwards. Doing so will recover the K1,2 box, which
is part of the sponge construction’s capacity.
Now that the attacker has access to the K1,2 and K1,3
boxes, they can run the * operation backwards, to recover
J1,2. This can then be used, along with J1,1, to recover I2.
This is shown in Figure 2
These same four steps can be repeated, by shifting our
focus to the right by two boxes. J1,2 and I3 can recover
J1,3, which is used alongside K1,3 to find K1,4. Then K1,4 is
used with C2 to find J1,4. Finally, J1,4 and J1,3 are used to
I1 I2 I3 I4
C1
*
J1,1
*
J1,2
*
J1,3
*
J1,4
C2
*
K1,4
*
K1,3
*
K1,2
*
K1,1
Figure 2: Recovering J1,1, K1,2, J1,2 and I2
find I4. This method can be repeated further if the internal
state is more than four boxes wide. As a result, increasing
the width of the internal state does little to strengthen the
cipher against this attack. This attack works against all
variants of pi-Cipher version 1. In total, this attack requires
time equal to a single round of the pi permutation, and only
requires enough memory to store the recovered values of the
internal state.
4. STATERECOVERY, USINGDIVIDE-AND-
CONQUER, ON TWO ROUNDS OF pi-
CIPHER
The one-round attack was trivial because the known bi-
trate values were close to each other. They were only sep-
arated by a small number of unknown values, which were
easily found. This is less easy with two rounds, since the
known values are distanced further apart.
An attacker can use I1 and C1 to recover J1,1, as before.
But without knowledge of K1,1, from the third row, they
cannot go any further.
However, there are three variants of pi-Cipher version 1
which have a box size smaller than the key size. For pi16-
Cipher096 and pi16-Cipher128, the word size is only 16 bits
long. Since each box contains four words, the total size of a
box is 64 bits. For pi32-Cipher256, the size of a box is 128
bits long. Each of these is smaller than the key sizes. An
exhaustive search on a single box would be much quicker
than an exhaustive search upon the entire keyspace.
The attacker starts by trying all possibilities for the K2,2
box, in the second round. Once this value is known, the
attacker can use it with K2,1, to recover J2,1, and also with
K2,3, to recover J2,2. Next, the attacker uses J2,1 and J2,2,
along with the constant C3, to recover K1,1 and K1,2, from
the first round.
At this point the attacker has run part of the permuta-
tion backwards for a single round. The attacker started with
the three left-most boxes and used them to recover the two
left-most boxes from the round previous. This can be gen-
eralised further. If an attacker knows the n leftmost boxes,
they can run the permutation backwards, to find the n − r
leftmost boxes, prior to the permutation, where r is the num-
ber of rounds. The same is true for the n right-most boxes,
although this fact is far less useful.
The next step for the attacker is to recover the J1,1 box,
before using it to finally retrieve the I1 box. All of these
steps can be seen in Figure 3.
When the attacker retrieves the I1 value, they can com-
pare it against the value they already have for I1. If the K2,2
value the attacker chose was correct, the recovered I1 value
will match against the value the attacker already knows. If
the K2,2 value was incorrect, the two I1 values will match
with very low probability. If there is not a large bias, then
there would be a 24·W chance that a K2,2 guess will result
in the correct I1 result. Since there are 2
4·W − 1 false K2,2
guesses, we would expect there to be one false positive, but
not many more.
At this point, the attacker has either recovered K2,2, or
they have recovered a small number of potential K2,2 can-
didates. Since they have been able to verify the K2,2 box
independently of the K2,4 box, this forms the basis of a
divide-and-conquer attack. The rest of the attack is simple:
The attacker guesses the K2,4 box. For each possible com-
bination of the K2,4 box and the candidates for the K2,4
box, the attacker runs the permutation backwards. Since
the attacker now has the entire internal state, this is not
difficult.
If the attacker had to testK2,4 against every possibleK2,2,
then this would be equivalent to brute forcing the internal
state. However, the previous steps should have eliminated
almost all of the potential K2,2 values. For each combina-
tion of K2,4 and K2,2 candidate, the attacker can test the
result against I3, before the permutation. If this matches,
the attacker can run the permutation further backwards, to
verify the result against the input padding, and recover the
key.
The initial exhaustive search on K2,2 would require 2
64
time, for the 16 bit variants, and 2128 time, for the 32 bit
variant. The following exhaustive search on K2,4 would also
take the same amount of time, multiplied by the number
of potential K2,2 candidates. If we expect one or two false
positives, along with the true K2,2 value, this will take a
total time of 266 for the 16 bit variants, and 2130 for the 32
bit variant.
The space requirements are still rather small. Since any
false K2,2 and K2,4 values can be discarded immediately
when they don’t match the known values, the attacker does
not need a large amount of storage.
5. STATERECOVERYONTHREEROUNDS
OFpi-CIPHER
This attack is similar to the attack on two-round pi-Cipher.
However, the three-round attack is actually faster than the
attack on two-rounds. The structure of this attack is shown
in Figure 4.
Like the two-round attack, the attacker starts by guessing
the first unknown K value, in this case K3,2. They then
recover the boxes up the left hand side of the permutation,
until they find the K1,1 value in the third row. Because
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Figure 3: Recovering I1, by exhaustive search on K2,2
this is now a three-round permutation, this method will no
longer allow the attacker to retrieve the I1 bitrate value.
However, the attacker can use I1 with C1, like in the first
attack, to recover the value J1,1 in the second row.
At this point, the attacker can use the values J1,1 and
K1,1 to find the value K1,2. The attacker can continue to
recover new values down the diagonal, until they recover the
K3,4 capacity value. At this point, the attacker has access
to the entire state, after the permutation. It is easy for the
attacker to run the permutation backwards, to find the rest
of the unknown values.
Since K3,2 was found by exhaustive search, the attacker
will need to verify that the result was correct. After running
the permutation backwards, the attacker will find the I3
value. They can see if this matches the original I3 value,
which they got from the bitrate. If there is more than one
match, the attacker can continue running the permutation
backwards. This can verify the answer against the input
padding function, and also recover the key.
Like the previous attack, this will only work against those
variants of pi-Cipher where guessing the contents of a single
box is faster than guessing the key. However, this attack
does not use a divide-and-conquer method, and is several
times faster than the two-round attack. In total, the entire
attack should take time 264, for 16 bit variants, and 2128,
for the 32 bit variant.
6. ONEROUNDSTATERECOVERY, USING
MULTIPLE MESSAGE BLOCKS
Each of the attacks shown so far require that an attacker
has access to two consecutive bitrate values, from before
and after a single pi permutation. This was a reasonable as-
sumption with pi-Cipher version 1. The attacker could lift
the first bitrate value directly from a ciphertext block. The
second bitrate value could be found in the authentication
tag. If a message had a only a single block, had no authen-
ticated data, and didn’t use a secret message number, then
the authentication tag would contain only the bitrate from
the lone message block.
However, pi-Cipher version 2.0 uses an updated padding
function. Now, even if there is no associated data, it will still
be padded out to a full block. As a result, the authentication
tag now contains a combination of the message block tag and
the associated data tag, and it is not practical to extract one
from the other. The attack in this section does not require
two consecutive bitrate values. Instead, it uses the bitrate
values from two consecutive message blocks. These can be
run backwards, and compared against each other, to recover
unknown capacity values. These bitrate values are found by
XORing the message blocks against the ciphertext blocks.
This will retrieve the original bitrate, as it was prior to the
message block being inserted.
This attack is based upon the one round distinguisher
for pi-Cipher, first explained in the pi-Cipher version 1 sub-
mission document. It is designed for use against the pi16-
Cipher096 variant, but not against variants with other word
sizes. In this section, it is assumed that the word size is
always 16 bits.
Again, this attack starts by an exhaustive search of the un-
known K1,2 value, and then running the permutation back-
wards. After a single round the attacker has recovered the I1
and I2 values. The attacker then builds a list of I1, I2 values.
Unlike before, however, the attacker cannot compare these
values against a known bitrate value. In order to confirm the
K1,2 value the attacker uses a second message block with a
different bitrate. The attacker does an exhaustive search
on the K1,2 value, before running the permutation back, as
before. The attacker can then build a second list of I1, I2
values.
In pi-Cipher message blocks are generated from a common
internal state with a 64-bit counter inserted into the bitrate.
The 64-bit counter is incremented by 1, for each consecutive
message block, before being XORed into the internal state.
There is a 50% chance that the two internal states differ
by only one bit after the insertion of the counter. How-
ever, incrementing the counter may have caused carry bits
to propagate upwards. To fix this problem the attacker can
use this same method with two consecutive pairs of message
blocks. At least one pair will have only a single bit differ-
ence. However, this will double the time complexity of the
attack.
If the attacker has found the correct pair of K1,2 val-
ues, this will result in a pair of matching I2 values, and
a pair of I1 values which differ only in one bit. For incor-
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Figure 4: The Three Round Attack on pi-Cipher
rect K1,2 pairs, the resulting I1, I2 pairs will satisfy this only
with probability 2−128. There are 264 possible K1,2 values,
for both the first and second message block, so there are
2128 combinations of K1,2 values from the different message
blocks. Since each has a 2−128 chance of producing a false
positive, we would expect to identify one false K1,2 pair as
a candidate.
This provides a way of verifying the K1,2 block of the
capacity independently of the K1,4 block. This allows an
attacker to perform a divide-and-conquer attack on the in-
ternal state. The attacker continues by an exhaustive search
on the K1,4 block. For each candidate K1,2 pair, the attacker
chooses a value for K1,4, and derives the unknown I3 and I4
values. This is shown in Figure 5.
This time, there is no difference in either the I3 or I4 val-
ues. If the K1,4 pair is correct, both the I3 and I4 values
will match. As before, there are 2128 combinations of K1,4
values, each with a 2−128 chance of producing a false posi-
tive. We will expect to find one false positive for each time
the K1,4 pairs are guessed. The attacker will end up with
several candidate K1,2 and K1,4 pairs. The correct pair can
be verified against the internal state of a different message
block. If the I1 through I4 values are correct, the attacker
will be able to generate the ciphertexts for other message
blocks. If the values are incorrect, the ciphertext should
match with probability 2−128.
In total, this attack will take time 268. Each generating
each pair of lists will required 265 time. This is multiplied
by four, since the attacker will need to do this for both the
K1,2 and K1,4 values, and separately for two consecutive
pairs of message blocks. The time is doubled again, because
the attacker will need to compute lists for the false K1,2
candidates. Since each element in the list contains 8 words,
the total space complexity is 268 16-bit words, or 269 bytes.
Once the attacker has the internal state, they can run the
permutation backwards. Doing this will recover the secret
key, but it will add some extra time to the attack, since the
attacker will need to perform an exhaustive search on the
64-bit counter value. This is described in the next section.
7. RUNNINGTHE INTERNAL STATEBACK-
WARDS, TO RECOVER THE KEY
Once an attacker has recovered the internal state they
can run the pi permutation backwards. This can be used to
verify the internal state against the initial padding, and also
to recover the secret key. However, at each step, additional
information was XORed into the bitrate. The attacker needs
to know this information, so that they can remove it.
First, the attacker will need to be able to retrieve the bi-
trate as it was prior to the message block being inserted.
This can be done by XORing the known bitrate against the
message block. Then, the internal state can be run back-
wards. However, to run the cipher further backwards, the
attacker needs access to the 64-bit counter. This counter is
taken from the capacity immediately after the first pi per-
mutation.
If there is no secret message number and no associated
data blocks, the 64-bit counter can be lifted directly from
the known state. This is assumed to be the case in the first
three attacks. However, for version 2.0 of pi-Cipher, there
is always at least one associated data block. The attacker
can no longer recover the counter from the internal state.
To continue running the state backwards, the attacker must
guess the counter. This will take time 264.
The attacks in this work assume that there is no secret
message number being used. Accordingly, the attacker does
not need to find it to continue rewinding the permutation.
If there are any associated data blocks, the attacker will
need to know their combined tag to run the permutation
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Figure 5: Recovering the I3 and I4 values
further backwards. This can be found by running the per-
mutation forwards, to find the tag for each of the message
blocks. These can be subtracted from the final tag, leaving
the tag for the associated data. Once the attacker knows
the associated data tags—or if there is no associated data—
they can run the pi permutation backwards. Then, they need
only go back one additional time, to recover the initial state.
This state should be the public message number appended
to the key, with some padding.
The attacker can verify the result, by checking the public
message number and padding against the result. If success-
ful, the attacker has recovered the secret key.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This work showed several attacks against pi-Cipher, one
of the entrants in the CAESAR cryptographic competition.
The first attack works on all variants of pi-Cipher version
1, and can break one round with negligible time and space.
It does this by using known bitrate values, along with the
public pi-Cipher constants, to retrieve the unknown values
in the internal state.
This is not sufficient for breaking further rounds, however.
The second attack starts by performing an exhaustive search
upon one unknown value in the capacity. This value can
then be verified independently of the remaining unknown
value. This allows for a divide-and-conquer attack upon two
rounds, but it only applies to those cipher variants where
exhaustive search upon one value is faster than exhaustive
search on the key.
The third attack is similar to the second in that it starts by
performing an exhaustive search upon one unknown value.
However, when pi-cipher is using three rounds, the first un-
known value can be used to find the second. This makes the
three round attack more efficient than the attack upon two
rounds.
However, each of these attacks requires two sets of bitrate
values, from before and after a single permutation of the
sponge construction. This is possible in pi-Cipher version
1, but due to a change in the padding function, the same
method does not work with version 2.0.
To fill this gap, the fourth attack is designed to work on
one round of pi-Cipher version 2.0. However, it is less effi-
cient than the other attacks, it only works against a single
pi-Cipher, and it also requires a large space complexity.
It is possible that future research will be able to improve
upon these results. The second and third attacks both in-
clude an exhaustive search on an unknown value, which is
then verified against a known value. It is possible that
deeper analysis of the ARX * operation, which is glossed
over in this work, may find a way to retrieve these values
faster than exhaustive search.
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